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Abstract: Micro evidence on the relationship between wages and unemployment has
been provided recently in a series of contributions by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, 1995).
They argue for the existence of a wage curve linking local wages to local unemployment. They
claim the relationship to be static. They also claim that the unemployment elasticity of pay is
–0.1 across-countries. They claim that this shows that countries exhibit the same degree of wage
flexibility.
In this paper we study wage determination in Argentina. We believe that both regional
and national factors affect wage setting. Thus, we also favor the modelization at the regional level
of aggregation. However, we show that a regional wage two-way fixed effects error component
model does not identify the effect of aggregate variables on wages though it controls for them.
Thus, the claim that the estimated unemployment elasticity of pay in this model provides a good
measure of wage flexibility may be misleading.
We propose a three-step estimator that may identify the whole set of parameters of
interest in a wage equation. That is, we propose a statistical procedure that may consistently
estimate the coefficients of both local and aggregate variables that affect wage setting.
We reject the existence of a static wage curve in favor of a dynamic regional wage
equation. Additionally, we tentatively favor an error correction mechanism representation instead
of a Phillips curve type representation for the common time series component of the regional
wages.
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error correction mechanism and Argentina.
JEL classifications: C2, E24 and J30.
March, 1999
This paper has benefited greatly from the comments of my supervisor, Steve Nickell. I
also thank R. Di Tella, Andrew Oswald and seminar participants at the University of San Andres.
Needless to say, all remaining errors are my own.
Email: Sebastian.Galiani@wolfson.ox.ac.uk
11.   Introduction
Real wage responsiveness to unemployment is a key issue in macroeconomic
analysis. A higher degree of wage flexibility implies, ceteris paribus, a lower equilibrium
unemployment rate (see, e.g., Bean, 1994, Blanchard and Katz, 1997, Layard et al., 1991
and Pissarides, 1990).
Much of the early empirical work analyzing the relationship between wages and
unemployment was based on country time-series data (see, e.g., Alogoskoufis and
Manning, 1988, Bean et al., 1986, Layard et al., 1991 and Newell and Symons, 1985).
Recently, in a couple of very important contributions, Blanchflower and Oswald (1990,
1994) shifted the emphasis more to the use of micro data sets. They use repeated cross-
sectional data on individuals in a range of countries to examine the wage-unemployment
relationship. They find that in any given region, if local unemployment rises, wages fall
ceteris paribus.1 Thus, they use the variability of wages and unemployment across-
regions and time to estimate the impact of the latter on the former. Moreover, they claim
that the relationship between wages and unemployment is static, that is, that any change
in local unemployment exercises all its impact on local wages during a year. They call
this negative relationship between local wages and local unemployment the wage curve.
Finally, they argue that the unemployment elasticity of pay is around –0.1 for an
important range of countries. Thus, for example, an increase in local unemployment from
five to six percent (i.e. a 20 percent rise) in any given year will reduce local wages by two
percent, ceteris paribus.
                                                                
1 Of course, contrary to the claims of Blanchflower and Oswald (1995), this finding does not challenge at
all the Harris-Todaro (1970) model.
2Both the lack of dynamic adjustment of wages and the apparently homogeneous
unemployment elasticity of pay have aroused many debates. Card and Hyslop (1997),
Bell (1997a), Bell (1997b) and Blanchard and Katz (1997) present convincingly evidence
that shows that there is a high degree of persistence in regional wages. Thus, it is
plausible to conclude that the best specification for a regional wage equation is one that
assumes a dynamic adjustment of wages. However, there is no consensus in the literature
about the degree of autoregression displayed by regional wages and why there exists such
autocorrelation in the first place. Hence, as Blanchard and Katz (1997) argue, more
research on this topic is desirable.
 Additionally, those authors also show that the short-run elasticity of pay is
significatively lower than –0.1.2  Furthermore, comparing Bell’s papers one also find that
both short and long run elasticities of pay differ greatly between United States and United
Kingdom. However, some of the reported long run elasticities of pay are not very
different from –0.1.
In this paper we pay another look at the estimation and interpretation of dynamic
regional wage equations using the Argentine household survey for the period 1990-1997.
There are some other reasons that justify the exercise. First, it is germane to evaluate, in
well-specified models, whether or not there is variability in the estimated unemployment
elasticity of pay across-countries. This is quite relevant because it is often argued that
countries have different wage setting institutions which in turn lead to more or less wage
rigidity and hence, ceteris paribus, to different equilibrium unemployment rates.
However, as we argue in section 2, this issue is subtler than has been recognized in the
3wage curve literature. The point is that if aggregate variables influence wage
determination at the regional level (i.e. aggregate unemployment), their impact is not
identified in models that include time dummy variables. Thus, the comparison of the
estimated coefficients of the elasticity of pay in these models does not provide a cross-
country comparison of the degree of wage flexibility. To circumvent the lack of
identification of the parameters associated with the aggregate variables in regional wage
equations, we propose a three-step procedure that identifies the impact of both local and
aggregate variables on local wage determination. This constitutes a methodological
contribution to the literature.
Additionally, some authors argue that what matters for equilibrium
unemployment determination is not the unemployment elasticity of pay but the
unemployment semi-elasticity of pay (see, e.g., Layard et al., 1991, chapter 9). The
reason for this is the following: as the equilibrium unemployment rate gets higher and
higher, excess unemployment becomes less and less effective at reducing wage pressure.
If this were the case, the countries with higher equilibrium unemployment rates are still
the ones that have the lower unemployment semi-elasticity of pay, that is, the ones that
have the lower wage flexibility, given that all of them are supposed to have the same
unemployment elasticity of pay.
Second, Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) celebrates Hoddinott (1993) estimate of a
wage curve for Cote d’Ivore because it was the first estimate of the local unemployment
elasticity of pay for a developing country. We agree that more work has to be done
exploring the information available outside the OECD countries and this paper does that.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
2 Indeed, some of the elasticities of pay reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), Table 9.1, are quite
different from –0.1. Additionally, Teulings and Hartog (1998) rightly point out that the model specification
4Finally, the last decade has seen some dramatic changes in the Argentine economy. After
stagnating during the high inflation of the 1980s, GDP growth took off in the 1990s
following the launch of a major stabilization and structural reform program. Among its
reforms, the program included a substantial trade liberalization package as well as a
wide-ranging privatization program. During this period both employment and the labor
force grew rapidly until 1993 when employment started to slow down and unemployment
began to rise. This increase accelerated during 1994 and by 1995, a year of economic
depth slump, unemployment reached an unprecedented 18.4 percent. Since 1996,
however, it has been falling fast and by the end of 1998 it was 12.4 percent.  Thus, it is
interesting to look at the data in this particular context.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we analyze some important
methodological issues. In section 3 we present the data in some detail and estimate
dynamic regional wage equations that identify the effect of both local and aggregate
variables on local wages for Argentina. Finally, in section 4, we present the conclusions
of the paper.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
under which these coefficients are estimated differ and hence they are not strictly comparable.
52. Some methodological considerations
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) merge several cross-sections of data on individuals
that reside in different regions of a country and estimate the coefficients of the
conditional expectation of the logarithm of wages. They condition individual wages on a
set of demographic controls, region fixed effects, time effects and the logarithm of the
regional unemployment rates. They call this conditional expectation the wage curve.
Given the structure of the data available, they are not able to condition on the past
level of individual wages. However, there is much evidence, coming from individual
panel data analysis that shows that individual earnings are autocorrelated, although they
present huge variance (see, e.g., Abowd and Card, 1989, Dickens, 1996 and Moffit and
Gottschalk, 1993). Note that even the existence of a low level of positive autocorrelation
in both individual wages and regional unemployment would bias upward the absolute
value of the unemployment elasticity of pay coefficient if the estimation does not
condition on the past level of wages. Therefore, given that national representative data
bases are cross-sectional data, we believe that the parameter of interest is only identified
at the regional level, that is, by estimating conditional regression functions of regional
wages.
Additionally, efficiency wage or wage bargaining theories suggest that wage setting
depends on reservation wages, labor productivity and the state of the labor market (see
Layard et al., 1991). Blanchard and Katz (1997, 1999) argue that the reservation wage is
likely to depend on both productivity and lagged wages. Moreover, Card (1990)
decomposes real wage changes during the course of a contract into intended and
6unintended components using Canadian contract data. He finds that both changes in real
wages over the course of the previous contract have similar effects on wages in the next
contract. Blanchard and Katz (1997) conclude that Card’s (1990) results suggest that the
actual own lagged wage plays a direct role in wage determination and it is not only just a
proxy for some other variables, like productivity, which matter in wage determination
and are correlated with the lagged wage. Certainly, the lagged wage may play its role
through the reservation wage as suggested by Blanchard and Katz (1997, 1999).
Hence, to estimate our wage equations, we first follow Blanchard and Katz (1997)
and estimate dynamic regional wage two-way fixed effects error component equations in
two-steps. This procedure is useful because it permits us to control for the impact of
changes in demographic factors on the change in wages before identifying the effect of
regional unemployment on regional wages. This two-step approach is also usually
recommended to deal with the problem of random group or cluster effects in the data
(see, e.g., Dickens and Katz, 1986). But the reason for estimating the model in two steps
is the identification of the parameter of interest. Canziani (1997) presents evidence that
shows that once regional fixed effects are controlled for, there is no evidence of clusters
in the error structure of the wage curves he estimates. In any case, there are others
alternative estimators to the two-step approach we follow here to deal with the random
group effects (see, e.g., Huber, 1967 and Moulton, 1986).
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) themselves estimate a dynamic regional model
using regional-cells data and find little autocorrelation on this specification. However,
some papers have suggested that this result was driven by the data used and by the
7presence of measurement errors in the dependent variable which, as it is well known,
turns out to be pervasive in the estimation of dynamic models (see Bell, 1997a).
Finally, we have to address a very important point related to the interpretation of the
parameter of interest in (dynamic) regional wage two-way fixed effects error component
equations. Although Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, 1995) claim that the
unemployment elasticity of pay coefficient measures the degree of wage flexibility of a
country, this is not quite right. Letting aside whether it is the unemployment elasticity or
the semi-elasticity of pay what matters in the determination of equilibrium
unemployment, suppose that the true wage setting function relates regional wages to
aggregate productivity or national wages, and both regional and national unemployment.
Then, a dynamic regional wage two-way fixed effects error component model will
estimate the local unemployment elasticity of local pay. This will be different from the
national unemployment elasticity of national pay. The difference between these two
measures of wage flexibility may arise from an attempt by unions to set similar wages in
all regions or because relative conditions matter in wage determination.
Let equation (1) below be the estimated wage equation, where w measures the
logarithm of local wages, u measures the logarithm of local unemployment, mi denotes
the region effect and lt denotes the time effect.
                               ititititit u emlbj +++-= -1ww                                 (1)
Note that lt is region-invariant and it accounts for any time-specific effect that is not
included in the regression. Thus, if the wage setting at the local level is affected by the
8national unemployment rate, this effect will be accounted for the year fixed effects
included in the regression function (1).
Alternatively, one can try to account for the region-invariant effects on local
wages including aggregate variables in a dynamic one-way fixed effects error component
model. However, to be successful, this exercise requires that the estimated regression
function control for all the aggregate variables that affect local wages. This may be a
difficult thing to do. Indeed, it is here that the virtue of using panel data resides, a virtue
emphasized by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). One can control for all the aggregate
effects without the necessity of measuring them, a difficult task, particularly, whenever
there are unobservable region-invariant effects. For example, suppose that although
unemployment benefits are constant during the period studied and are the same across
regions, the number of insider workers, that is, those workers who have a higher
probability of getting benefits if they were fired, changes during the period studied. Then,
the effect of unemployment benefits on wage determination becomes difficult to control
for in a one-way fixed effects error component regression function but not in a two-way
fixed effects error component regression function.
Thus, to conclude this section, we shall say that the identifiable parameter in a
dynamic regional wage two-way fixed effects error component model is an interesting
one. Obviously, it is a very useful parameter to know in the analysis of regional
economics. Additionally, if national variables do not affect regional wage setting much,
the estimation of a regional wage equation will provide a good measure of wage
flexibility at the national level. Finally, and more important, it may be possible, although
difficult, to identify both measures of wage flexibility estimating a dynamic regional
9wage equation. We discuss this issue in section 3.4 below where we propose a three-step
procedure to identify the impact of both local and aggregate variables on wage setting.
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3.   A dynamic wage equation
3.1 Analysis of the regional wage data
In this section, we use data from the household survey to estimate a regional
dynamic wage equation for Argentina for the period 1990-1997. During this period, the
household survey sampled the population of the main twenty-five urban agglomerates of
Argentina. Here, we denote them regions. The household survey is conducted twice per
year (in May and October). Hence, we have sixteen cross-sections available.
Unfortunately, there were no data tapes available for most regions before the 1990’s, a
period characterized by high inflation and recession. This reduces the time dimension of
our sample and imposes some restrictions in the analyses we can do. Additionally, the
content of information in the data tapes change during the period studied. This also
restricts us in the analysis.
The household survey is conducted by the Argentine National Institute of
Statistics and Census (INDEC). The household survey uses a typical stratified (by
regions) two-stage sampling design. 3 Its administration is decentralized by regions.
During the period studied, there are some missing regions’ data tapes. Additionally, the
survey was not conducted in two regions once during the period studied. In terms of the
panel of regions we construct, we consider the missing observations as ignorable and
                                                                
3 Clusters are randomly selected with probability proportional to the number of households they contain.
The same number of households is selected from each cluster, producing a self-weighting design. There is a
post-sampling re-weighting of family units, to correct by differential response rates by sampling clusters.
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pursue the analysis with the remaining unbalanced panel. We believe it to be justified in
that these observations are missed for administrative reasons.
In the regions the survey is conducted, its coverage is virtually complete. We
focus the analysis only on employees who report monthly earnings and have only one
job. Thus, we exclude from the sample, self-employed, owner-managers, unpaid workers
and employees with more than one job. The usable cross-section sample size is over
twenty thousand for every wave of the survey. In addition, we also conduct the analysis
excluding females from the sample since there is some evidence that the wage response
to local unemployment may differ by gender (see, e.g., Janssens and Konings, 1998).
Additionally, female participation has changed substantially over the period and this may
introduce some difficulties for inference.
For reasons we discussed in the previous section, we proceed in three-steps. In the
first-step, we estimate a conditional expectation function for different measures of
individual earnings (monthly and hourly). Then, in the second-step we use the regional
expected wages to estimate dynamic regional wage two-way fixed effects error
component equations. Finally, in the third-step we identify the impact of aggregate
variables on regional wages.
The survey provides information on individual monthly earnings. Individuals
report their earnings in the month before the survey is conducted. Individuals also report
total hours worked. We use individual hours worked in their main occupation during the
survey reference week to compute earnings per hour in a straightforward way.
We conduct the analysis using both monthly and hourly individual earnings. On
the one hand, it can be argued that the hourly wage is the right price of labor at a point in
12
time and it should be preferred. On the other hand, earnings per hour are likely to be more
error prone than monthly earnings (see Bound et al., 1994).4 Thus, there are reasons for
conducting the analysis using both earnings measures. Finally, it is also worth noting that
Card (1995) argues that Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) introduce in their analysis of
the relationship between regional earnings and regional unemployment an extraneous
negative correlation. This occurs because they use individual annual wages as a measure
of the price of labor and those states that have low annual wages are likely to be states
were workers have not worked a full-year due to unemployment. This correlation is of no
interest because it tells us nothing about the relationship between the price of labor and
unemployment, and much about the relationship between weeks worked and
unemployment. Although our measure of monthly earnings would not introduce such an
extraneous negative correlation between earnings and unemployment, still, it is possibly
that the unemployment elasticity of pay reflects both responsiveness of wage rates to
unemployment and to hours worked per week. This possibility reinforces the necessity to
conduct the analysis using both measures of earnings.
We assume, as it is usual in the literature, that the earnings conditional expectation
function is linear in the parameters, and hence we condition the logarithm of the
individual earnings on a set of regional dummy variables, a set of industry affiliation
dummy variables, a set of dummy variables capturing the educational attainment of the
individual and a quadratic polynomial in potential experience. We allow all coefficients
except the coefficients of the regional dummies to differ by gender. While these are by no
                                                                
4 They show, using the panel of income dynamics validation study that earnings per hour are less reliable
reported than annual earnings. They also show that biases in estimating earnings functions are relatively
small but still our concern here is due to the possible inference difficulties introduced by this type of bias in
the estimation of dynamic models.
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means an exhaustive set of controls, we know that they are the most important
explanatory variables in standard cross-section wage equations. What is more, the
proportion of the variance of the individual earnings that is explained by this set of
controls is extremely high. The coefficient of determination is on average 0.9. This high
statistic is explained by the huge variation existent in regional earnings, which is captured
in the regressions by the regional dummy variables. Thus, our estimates of the regional
dummies are extremely precise.
Solon et al. (1994) shows that the true procyclicality of real wages is normally
obscured in aggregate time series analysis due to the existence of a composition bias.
They show that aggregate statistics are constructed in a way that gives more weight to
low-skill workers during expansions than during recessions. We believe the set of
estimated regional dummy variables provides us with a regional wage statistic that does
not suffer from composition bias. Indeed, as long as we have enough observations, we
consistently estimate the parameters of the conditional expectation function. However, if
the correlation of the observable and unobservable characteristics of the individuals is
altered in any cyclical way, then, it may be the case that our statistics would also suffer
from composition bias.
 Finally, there is an additional minor point to be considered when estimating the
regional wages. To illustrate it, suppose that instead of a polynomial in potential
experience, we fit a spline on it to the data. Then, to estimate the set of regional dummies,
a typical procedure would be to restrict one coefficient per set of dummy variables but the
regional ones to be zero. This procedure estimates a full set of regional dummies. Note,
however, that these estimates do not provide us with an estimation of the expected
14
regional earnings. Still, these estimates are appropriate statistics whenever the parameters
of interest in the second-stage analysis are not the common time-effects across regions.
However, if we were interested in modeling these common time-effects, then, the
expectation of the regional earnings should be the statistics used, at least that an specific
demographic group were the focus of the research. Hence, instead of constraining one
coefficient per set of dummy variables to be zero in the estimation of the conditional
expectation function, we constraint the sum of each set of dummy variables (except, of
course, the coefficients of the regional dummies) to be zero transforming appropriately
the regional dummies so that the fitted value of the equation is not altered at all. Note that
the difference between these estimates of the regional dummies in every period t and any
other estimate of them is, say, kt, a common time-effect. In that way, the coefficient of
every regional dummy in a cross-section estimates the expected level of the logarithm of
earnings in the region while the coefficients of the other dummy variables estimates the
expected difference of the earnings of a particular group of individuals to the regional
mean (see Suits, 1984).
Instead of a spline in potential experience we fit a polynomial on it. This allows
us to derive two alternative statistics of regional expected earnings. The regional expected
level of earnings and the regional expected level of earnings of a new entrant to the labor
market. The comparison of both the trend and the cyclical change between these two
statistics is of potential interest. To evaluate the former statistic, we compute the
quadratic polynomial in potential experience in every region for every time period fixing
both the level of potential experience by gender and a the gender composition at the
regional means of these variables in the sample studied.  Given the small variation that
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exists among regions in these weights, there is no practical difference in considering that
the two estimations of the regional dummies adopted here only change them compared to
any other estimate by a common year effect.
In what follows, Y1it (W1it) is the expected real monthly (hourly) earnings of a
new entrant in region i at period t while Y2it (W2it) is the expected real monthly (hourly)
earnings in region i at period t. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show these statistics. Several patterns
are worth noting. First, there are huge regional differences in earnings. Roughly, earnings
increase as one moves geographically from the North regions to the South regions. Note
that every panel in both figures has the same scale. Second, there are no apparent
important differences in their trends. Third, after real earnings increased at the beginning
of the sample period, they decreased, particularly after unemployment started to increase.
For example, if we analyze the unweighted average of the male statistics, we obtain the
following stylized facts: the four statistics increase from the beginning of the period
studied until the first wave of the survey in 1994, although most of the increase has taken
place before 1993. The unweighted average monthly earnings of the new entrants
increased between 1990 and 1994 by thirty percent and then decreased twelve percent
while the same statistic for the average worker increased twenty-two percent before it
decreased eight percent. The hourly wages increased twenty-eight (seventeen) percent
and then decreased fifteen (ten) percent respectively. What is more, the four statistics
have at the end of the period studied the same values they had at the end of 1991 in spite
of the huge increase in labor productivity during the same period. It is worth noting that
the  wages of  the  new entrants  first increased more  than the  average  wages  and  then
also  decreased  more.  See both  Bils (1985)  and  Beadury and DiNardo (1991) for some
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Figure 3.1
Earnings by Region
Real Monthly Earnings by Region
Survey Wave
Earnings: (Y1) Earnings: (Y2)
Bahia Blanca
3.48
5.23
Catamarca Chaco Chubut Cordoba
Corrientes
3.48
5.23
Entre Rios Formosa GBA Jujuy
La Pampa
3.48
5.23
La Plata Larioja Mendoza Misiones
Neuquen
3.48
5.23
Rio Gallegos Rosario Salta San Juan
San Luis
90.1 97.2
3.48
5.23
Santa Fe
90.1 97.2
Santiago
90.1 97.2
Tierra del Fuego
90.1 97.2
Tucuman
90.1 97.2
Real Hourly Earnings by Region
Survey Wave
Hourly Earnings: (W1) Hourly Earnings: (W2)
Bahia Blanca
-1.5
0.04
Catamarca Chaco Chubut Cordoba
Corrientes
-1.5
0.04
Entre Rios Formosa GBA Jujuy
La Pampa
-1.5
0.04
La Plata Larioja Mendoza Misiones
Neuquen
-1.5
0.04
Rio Gallegos Rosario Salta San Juan
San Luis
90.1 97.2
-1.5
0.04
Santa Fe
90.1 97.2
Santiago
90.1 97.2
Tierra del Fuego
90.1 97.2
Tucuman
90.1 97.2
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Figure 3.2
Male Earnings by Region
Real Monthly Earnings by Region: Males
Survey Wave
Earnings: (Y1) Earnings: (Y2)
Bahia Blanca
3.47
5.49
Catamarca Chaco Chubut Cordoba
Corrientes
3.47
5.49
Entre Rios Formosa GBA Jujuy
La Pampa
3.47
5.49
La Plata Larioja Mendoza Misiones
Neuquen
3.47
5.49
Rio Gallegos Rosario Salta San Juan
San Luis
90.1 97.2
3.47
5.49
Santa Fe
90.1 97.2
Santiago
90.1 97.2
Tierra del Fuego
90.1 97.2
Tucuman
90.1 97.2
Real Hourly Earnings by Region: Males
Survey Wave
Hourly Earnings: (W1) Hourly Earnings: (W2)
Bahia Blanca
-1.52
0.25
Catamarca Chaco Chubut Cordoba
Corrientes
-1.52
0.25
Entre Rios Formosa GBA Jujuy
La Pampa
-1.52
0.25
La Plata Larioja Mendoza Misiones
Neuquen
-1.52
0.25
Rio Gallegos Rosario Salta San Juan
San Luis
90.1 90.7
-1.52
0.25
Santa Fe
90.1 97.2
Santiago
90.1 97.2
Tierra del Fuego
90.1 97.2
Tucuman
90.1 97.2
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evidence that shows that the wages of the new employees are more sensitive to the cycle
than the wages of the insiders workers. Fourth, the differences in earnings between an
average experienced worker and a new entrant to the labor market are wider and
apparently most affected by the cycle for males than for the whole population.
Finally, it is worth noting the following issues. We estimate the cross-sectional
conditional expectation functions by the method of least squares, that is, we do not use
sampling weights.5 We ignore the observations with missing values and estimate the
conditional expectation function using the remaining usable observations.  In this case,
there are no compelling reasons to pursue another route.6 Additionally, we exclude, in
every wave of the survey, some observations of individuals that report extremely high
number of hours worked per week. In any case, none of the results of this paper would be
changed at all if we had not excluded these observations.
3.2. Dynamic regional wage equations
Generically, we adopt a dynamic specification for our empirical model and
postulate a dynamic two-way fixed effects error component model of the form:
                   ititititit uyy emlbj +++-= - L)(1                (2)
                                                                
5 It is not obvious whether or not there is a case in which their use is recommended (see DuMouchel and
Duncan, 1983 and Kish and Frenkel, 1974). If the population is homogenous, both the weighted and the
least squares estimators are consistent but the latter estimator is more efficient in its class and hence it is
preferred. In any case, in this sample, there are no statistically significant differences in the estimates
obtained.
6 Note, for example, that regression imputation would make not difference in this case an it seems to be
more appropriately than the hot deck method used by the US Census Bureau (see, e.g., Lillard et al., 1986).
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where yit is any of our regional first-stage wage statistics and uit is the natural logarithm
of the unemployment rate. The unemployment rates are the region unemployment rates
for the whole population and the male unemployment rates. Sampling weights are used to
compute these unemployment rates.
Our empirical model may present some problems of inference. First, there is the
possible problem of measurement errors in the dependent variables. For example, Bell
(1997a) shows how important measurement errors in the dependent variable could be in a
dynamic specification like the one we estimate. He suggests that a good instrument would
be the dependent variable lagged twice. Measurement errors in individual earnings seems
to be aggravated when independent measures of earnings and hours are used to compute
an hourly statistic, much more when the time unit of measurement of both variables
differs (see Bound et al., 1994).
Second, unemployment may also need to be instrumented. Although it is plausible
that the unemployment rate at the regional level is essentially a predetermined variable in
the context of the wage equations we estimate, it may be the case that the unemployment
rate is not exogenous for the parameters of interest. This may be even due to a problem of
measurement error. In regions with small sample size and in time periods of low
unemployment, the size of the confidence intervals of the estimates of the unemployment
rates is not ignorable.
Unfortunately, as it is often the case, there is some uncertainty associated with the
selection of instruments. Two issues are involved. First, the instruments must not change
the conditional expectation of the dependent variable. They must also be reasonably
20
correlated with the instrumented variable, otherwise, the instrumental variables standard
errors are too large. Second, given the specification adopted, the model is only identified
if the instrumental variables present variation both across regions and time.
Finally, even if the errors of the wage equation are i.i.d, this model cannot be
consistently estimated by the method of dummy variables least squares as long as the
number of periods is small (see Nickell, 1981). This semi-inconsistency is due to the
asymptotic correlation that exists between the transformed lagged dependent variable and
the transformed error term. Nickell (1981) proves that in an autorregresive model with no
other exogenous regressors the bias is of order in probability one over the panel time
dimension length (T), Op(T-1). He also shows that the bias is aggravated if the model also
includes exogenous regressors. However, we do have a panel of sixteen cross-sections
and hence this bias may not be a serious problem. Indeed, in our case T tends to N, the
cross-section dimension of the panel, which exhausts the population studied.
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose an efficient (among its class) linear estimator that
is consistent even for short time dimension panels. To estimate the parameters in dynamic
panel data models, they suggest to take first differences of the regression function to
eliminate the individual specific effects, and estimate the differenced model by a
Generalized Method of Momemts (GMM) estimator using appropriately lagged
endogenous and predetermined variables as instruments in the transformed equations.
Note, nonetheless, that after differencing, yit-1 is correlated with the differenced
equation error, De it. Additionally, both uit and uit-1 may also be correlated with De it if uit is
not exogenous for the parameters of interests. However, as long as e it is serially
uncorrelated, all lags on y and u beyond t-1 are valid instrument for the differenced
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equation at period t. Hence, using appropriately lagged variables as instruments, we get
consistent estimators of the parameters of interest.
Thus, in addition to within group estimates, we present linear GMM estimates of the
parameters of interest by implementing the estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991). Note that this estimator will not only deal with the semi-inconsistency bias,
presumably small, but also with the possible measurement errors in the dependent
variable and the possible correlation between the current dated unemployment rate and
the error in the equation in levels.
The consistency of the GMM estimator we use depends crucially on the absence
of serial correlation in e it. If the disturbance e it is not serially correlated, there should be
evidence of significant negative first order serial correlation in the differenced residuals,
and there should not be any evidence of second order serial correlation in the differenced
residuals. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop tests for first order and second order
correlation in the differenced residuals. These tests are asymptotically standard normal
distributed under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. More generally, we present
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions to evaluate the specification of the model. The
null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instruments are not correlated with the
residuals in the first-difference equation. Under the null hypothesis, the asymptotic
distribution of this statistic is Chi-squared with as many degrees of freedom as
overidentifying restrictions are imposed in the estimation of the model.
Tables 1 and 2 present the estimated dynamic wage equations using monthly and
hourly wages respectively. We do have an unbalanced panel. Columns (1) and (2) present
the within group coefficient estimates. Naturally, whether the dependent variable is the
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average regional wage or it is the new entrants’ regional wage, the estimated coefficients
of interest are similar. Hence, in tables 1 and 2 we only report the estimates of the
modelization of the average regional wages. In the models, we alternatively include the
current value of the regional unemployment rate or its value lagged once.7 Some other
authors only consider the current unemployment rate but they estimate their models using
yearly frequency data instead of sixth monthly frequency data.  Thus, by working at a
higher frequency, lower frequency dynamics cannot be accounted for in the model and if
present, they will tend to be mixed in the model’s estimated coefficients. In any case, it is
plausible that the regional unemployment affect the wage setting with some lag.
First, we do not find a statistically significant effect of the regional unemployment
on the monthly regional earnings under this specification. We find some statistically
significant effect of the lag unemployment on hourly wages only. The lag unemployment
elasticity of hourly pay is –0.024 for males and –0.015 for the whole population. The
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable shows an important positive correlation of
regional earnings. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 0.6 when the
dependent variable is the monthly earnings and around 0.5 when it is the hourly earnings.
This finding does not depend on whether or not unemployment enters with a lag in the
model.
We next instrument the lagged dependent variable. Columns (3) and (5) report the
results. There are no differences at all in the autocorrelation coefficient in any of the
specifications. However, the estimated unemployment elasticity of pay increases in all
cases.  The estimated lag unemployment elasticity of hourly pay is –0.046 for males and
                                                                
7 We also enter both unemployment rates in the same equation but they were never statistically significant.
The lag unemployment has always a higher impact on wages on every model’s specification.
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–0.034 for the whole population. Also, for males, the lag unemployment elasticity of
monthly pay is statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level of significance. It is
–0.023.
Table 1: Dynamic regional wage equations
Dependent Variable: Log of monthly wages (Log Y2)
Independent
variable
OLS
(Within-
Group)
(1)
OLS
(Within-
Group)
(2)
GMM
(First-
Differences)
(3)
GMM
(First-
Differences)
(4)
GMM
(First-
Differences)
(5)
GMM
(First-
Differences)
(6)
Males
Log Y2it-1 0.61
 (0.053)
0.60
(0.05)
0.57
(0.08)
0.53
(0.07)
0.57
(0.09)
0.54
(0.08)
Log Uit -0.007
(0.01)
----- -0.01
(0.01)
-0.015
(0.017)
----- -----
Log Uit-1 ----- -.0.012
(0.01)
----- ----- -0.023 *
(0.013)
-0.027
(0.019)
Equation
standard error
0.038 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.33
Sargan Test ----- ----- 0.93 0.78 0.94 0.87
m1 0.94 0.90 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
m2 0.99 0.91 0.79 0.97 0.70 0.85
Whole Population
Log Y2it-1 0.57
(0.057)
0.57
(0.058)
0.58
(0.089)
0.57
(0.088)
0.58
(0.09)
0.58
(0.09)
Log Uit -0.005
(0.01)
----- -0.01
(0.01)
-0.004
(0.017)
----- -----
Log Uit-1 ----- -0.006
(0.01)
----- ----- -0.008
(0.01)
-0.018
(0.017)
Equation
standard error
0.038 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.35
Sargan Test ----- ----- 0.89 0.87 0.91 0.95
m1 0.53 0.53 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
m2 0.35 0.69 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.83
No. of
observations
350 350 325 325 325 325
Notes: (i) Log U is the logarithm of the respective unemployment rate. (ii) Time dummies are
included in all equations. (iii) Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time
series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. (iv) * Statistically different from zero at the
0.10 level of significance. ** Statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. The
autorregresive coefficient is always significant at the 0.01 level of significance. (v) For the
Sargan, m1 and m2 tests, the statistics reported are the p-values (i.e. the probability of generating
the calculated test statistic under the null hypothesis). (vi) The equation standard error refers to
the equation in levels. (vi) Columns (3) and (5): the basic instrument set is of the form Zi =
diag[yi1,…,yis : Dxis+2(1)], (s = 1,…,14), where xit(-1) is the vector of predetermined variables
included in the regression. Column (4): the instrument set is of the form Zi = diag[yi1,…,yis,  Duis,
Dlfpris+2], (s = 1,…,14). Column (6): the instrument set is of the form Zi = diag[yi1,…,yis, Duis,
Dlfpris+1] (s = 1,…,14). lfprit is the labor force participation rate in region i in period t.
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Table 2: Dynamic regional wage equations
Dependent Variable: Log of hourly wages (Log W2)
Independent
variable
OLS
(Within-
Group)
(1)
OLS
(Within-
Group)
(2)
GMM
(First-
Differences)
(3)
GMM
(First-
Differences)
(4)
GMM
(First-
Differences)
(5)
GMM
(First-
Differences)
(6)
Males
Log W2it-1 0.48
(0.06)
0.48
(0.06)
0.55
(0.09)
0.49
(0.10)
0.53
(0.09)
0.48
(0.09)
Log Uit -0.007
(0.01)
----- -0.02
(0.016)
-0.045 *
(0.028)
----- -----
Log Uit-1 ----- -.0.024 **
(0.011)
----- ----- -0.046 **
(0.021)
-0.057 *
(0.035)
Equation standard
error
0.043 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.040 0.038
Sargan Test ----- ----- 0.80 0.28 0.79 0.26
m1 0.45 0.63 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001
m2 0.44 0.41 0.14 0.21 0.18 0.34
Whole Population
Log W2it-1 0.48
(0.058)
0.48
(0.057)
0.51
(0.1)
0.50
(0.10)
0.50
(0.09)
0.49
(0.09)
Log Uit -0.003
(0.01)
----- -0.019
(0.015)
-0.031
(0.026)
----- -----
Log Uit-1 ----- -0.015 *
(0.009)
----- ----- -0.034 **
(0.014)
-0.04 **
(0.02)
Equation standard
error
0.044 0.044 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042
Sargan Test ----- ----- 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.62
M1 0.29 0.34 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
M2 0.46 0.50 0.07 0.06 0.16 0.19
No. of
observations
350 350 325 325 325 325
Notes: see table 1.
In columns (3) and (5), uit is at least (implicitly) assumed to be a predetermined
variable although, given our sample size, the over-identifying restrictions arising from
this assumption are not exploited in the estimation. We do not reject the null hypothesis
of the validity of the over-identifying restrictions nor the lack of autocorrelation in the e it
at the conventional levels of statistical confidence, that is, we do not reject the hypothesis
of first-order autocorrelation in De it nor the lack of second-order autocorrelation in De it.
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These results suggest that the “Nickell” bias is not a problem in this case but also
suggest that there is no reason to be concerned about measurement error in the dependent
variable in this data.8
Finally, in columns (4) and (6) we deal with the possible correlation of uit and e it.
We first use lagged unemployment as an instrument since this is the standard response.
Again, given our sample size, we do not exploit all the over-identifying restrictions
arising from the predetermination of the lagged values of uit. In almost every case, the
estimated unemployment elasticity of pay is increased. We then add the first difference of
the regional labor force participation rates as an instrument in the differenced equations
we estimate. The results do not change at all. Again, in these specifications we do not
reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the over-identifying restrictions nor the lack of
autocorrelation in the e it. Finally, we alternatively instrument regional unemployment
with a regional GDP growth measure calculated by weighting quarterly industry GDP
figures by the employment share of the industry in the region in the previous wave of the
survey (see Blanchard and Katz, 1992). The estimates are almost identically and are not
statistically different from the estimates reported in columns (4) and (6) although in some
cases the estimates are less precise.
The GMM estimates presented in tables 1 and 2 are all one-step estimates.
Although there exists two-step estimators that are asymptotically more efficient, it is well
know (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) that the two-step estimated standard errors in
dynamic models can be seriously biased downward, and for that reason, one-step
estimates with robust standard errors are often preferred.
                                                                
8 We check the robustness of this result by recursively eliminating the instruments in the later cross-
sections without obtaining any significant change in the estimates.
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The coefficient estimates for our preferred specification in column (6) suggest that
regional wages are autocorrelated. Hence, we reject the wage curve specification in favor
of a dynamic regional wage equation. We find that the degree of autocorrelation is higher
for monthly earnings than for hourly earnings while the opposite is true for the
unemployment elasticity of pay. We believe that it is plausible that the regional
unemployment affects regional wages with a lag. The short run unemployment elasticity
of hourly pay is statistically significant for both males and the whole population. It is -
0.057 and –0.04 respectively while the short run unemployment elasticity of monthly pay
is only marginally significant (at the 0.15 level of significance) for males. It is –0.027,
half the value of the hourly elasticity of pay. Thus, the local labor market conditions seem
to affect more the pay of males than that of the females and it affects more the hourly
earnings than the monthly earnings. Finally, we do not reject a long run unemployment
elasticity of local pay of –0.1 for hourly wages although we find it is significantly lower
than –0.1 for monthly wages.
The finding that the unemployment elasticity of hourly pay is higher than the
unemployment elasticity of monthly pay is quite interesting.  It  only  can  be the outcome
of a positive correlation between local hours worked and local unemployment.9 Hence,
we rule-out any non-interesting negative relationship between pay and unemployment
because of a reduction of hours worked of any type. Additionally, it is interesting because
the period during which unemployment increased was one of absolutely stability in the
                                                                
9 To quantify this relationship, we estimate the following regression function:
ittiitu nlm +++= -1it 014.0h
                                                              (2.12)
where h it is the logarithm of the average number of hours over the same observations we use to estimate our
statistics on regional earnings in region i in period t. The parenthetical figure is the t-statistic.
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price level. Thus, the increase in hours worked seems to have provided an additional
source of wage flexibility.
Turning to the international comparison of results, it is interesting to compare our
findings with the results reported in Bell (1997a, 1997b). For empirical models similar to
the one presented in table 2, although estimated by the method of LSDV, Bell (1997a)
finds, for US for the period 1980-1991, an autoregresive coefficient equal to 0.82 and an
unemployment elasticity of pay coefficient equal to –0.047. The dependent variable is the
hourly wage obtained from the CPS March files. Our estimates show a similar elasticity
of pay but much less persistence in wages. Hence, the long-run regional unemployment
elasticity of regional pay is higher in US than in Argentina. Bell (1997b) finds, for UK
for the period 1975-1995, using weekly wages, an autoregressive coefficient equal to 0.71
and an unemployment elasticity of pay coefficient equal to –0.014. Thus, both the short
and long run regional unemployment elasticity of regional pay in UK are lower than the
respective elasticities in Argentina. The same results hold in term of the regional
unemployment semi-elasticities of local pay although the differences with UK are smaller
while the differences with US are bigger.
To conclude this sub-section, we shall discuss two other results of our empirical
model. First, between the first wave of the survey in 1994 and the end of the period
studied, for example, the unweighted monthly wage of the average male worker
decreased eight percent while the unweighted male unemployment rate increased
approximately forty percent (indeed, this figure is the change in unemployment between
the last wave of survey of 1993 and the end of the period studied). Hence, given the
regional unemployment elasticity of regional pay we have estimated, some other factors
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have to account for the decrease in wages. This other factors are captured in the common
year effects and consequently, they are aggregate factors. Thus, aggregate factors have to
account for more than half of the decrease in average wages. Second, and precisely, there
is no point in discussing whether or not the autoregressive coefficient in the regional
wage equation suggests that wages are non-stationary. There is ample evidence
suggesting that wages are non-stationary. Naturally, there is nothing that precludes the
time effects being non-stationary. Thus, a priori, there is no necessity to reconcile the
unit-root normally found in aggregate wage equations with the autoregressive coefficient
that is usually found in dynamic regional wage two-way fixed effects error component
equations.
3.3. Long-term unemployment and wages
The empirical models of section 3.2 impose the unemployment elasticity of pay to
be unaffected by the duration composition of the stock of unemployed individuals.
However, it is often argued that the long-term unemployment represents a less effective
component of the pool of unemployed workers than do their short-term counterparts (see
Layard et al, 1991). For example, Layard and Nickell (1985, 1986 and 1987) present time
series evidence for UK that shows that disinflationary pressure is weakened as
unemployment duration increases. Bell (1997b) also shows the empirical relevance of
this hypothesis for UK using regional data. Interestingly, during the 80s, long-term
unemployed were nearly half the unemployed pool in UK, where an individual is
considered as a long-term unemployed if he has experienced a current spell longer than a
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year. The hypothesis that long-run unemployment reduces the unemployment elasticity of
pay is not tested for US, where most unemployment experiences are of short-term
duration. For example, neither Bell (1997a) nor Blanchard and Katz (1997) explore the
role of long-term unemployment in wage determination in US.
In Argentina, most unemployment episodes conclude after short periods of time.
For example, roughly, in every region, for every wave of the survey during the sample
period, around thirty percent of the unemployed has been in this state at most a month.
Naturally, after the huge increase in the unemployment rate in 1994 and 1995,
unemployment duration has increased although the mean duration of all unemployment
episodes is still quite low while the mean duration of the current spells has not increased
that much neither.
We explore the hypothesis that unemployment duration weakens wage pressures,
ceteris paribus, using the following model
                        ititititit uyy emldbj ++++-= -
it
L
it
1 U
U
                 (3)
where it
L
it U/U  is the proportion of long-term unemployment, where someone is
considered long-term unemployed if he has experienced a current spell longer than six
months. Layard and Nickell (1985) show that the results are not substantially altered if
this definition is adopted. We adopt this definition based on data restrictions. This model
specification is close to the one often adopted in the literature.
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As we expected, the results obtained do not alter at all those we present in
columns (4) and (6) of both tables 1 and 2. In every specification, the coefficient d is
positive but not statistically different from zero and it is always numerically close to zero.
3.4.  Aggregate unemployment and wages: towards a wage equation
We now evaluate whether or not aggregate unemployment affects regional wages,
and more generally, we study the general form of a wage equation that does not condition
on the time period studied.
Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) estimate a regional wage equation for Spain and
enter both regional and national unemployment rates as regressors. They found that the
national unemployment rate is more significant in explaining regional wages than the
regional unemployment rate. They suggest that this outcome is the result of an explicit
effort by Spanish unions to reduce wage dispersion across regions.
Turning to Argentina, its union density is estimated to be forty-five percent while
union coverage is approximately fifty percent. Most workers whose pay is covered by a
collective agreement have their wages determined, at least initially, by industry-wide
bargains struck between a national industry union and one or more employers federations.
Further wage agreements may be struck at lower levels right down to the firm level using
the industry-wide agreement as a basis. Additionally, in some sectors, collective
agreements include regional wage clauses or there may exist regional agreements.
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Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) also find that the regional unemployment coefficient
is unstable in the models they estimate. It decreases substantially when they enter both
unemployment rates compared to the coefficient they obtain when they only enter the
regional unemployment rate in the model. We think, this is a consequence of their model
specification.
To illustrate this point, we estimate some dynamic regional regression functions
in which we also include aggregate variables. In columns (1) and (3) of table 3 we
estimate the same model we report in column (6) of table 2 but we drop the time-
dummies and include in their replacement the following set of aggregate variables: the
logarithm of the aggregate total unemployment rate and its lag (Log Us), the logarithm of
and index of aggregate labor productivity and its lag (Log prods) and the change in the
average inflation rates between the periods May-October and November-April. prod is
given by real GDP  (at prices of 1986) in the quarter the household survey is conducted
divided by total employment in the respective wave of the survey and it is equal to 100 in
May 1990. We also add a constant to the differenced equation.
Columns (2) and (4) of table 3 reproduce column (6) of table 2. Note that here, the
set of aggregate variables, the trend and the set of dummies included in these
specifications span the same subspace that is spanned by the set of time-dummies
included in the regression functions of column (6) in table 2 and hence they are the same
model.
The models in columns (1) and (3) are restricted versions of the models in
columns (2) and (4) respectively. What turns out is that they are not valid reductions of
the unrestricted models. The set of aggregate regressors (together with the time trend)
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included does not span the same subspace that is spanned by the full set of time dummies.
There are other aggregate variables that affect wages and/or the functional form of the
model is not valid.  In any case, the result is that we get biased estimates of both local and
Table 3: Dynamic regional wage equations
Dependent Variable: Log of hourly wages (Log W2)
Independent
variable
GMM
(First-Differences)
(1)
GMM
(First-Differences)
(2)
GMM
(First-Differences)
(3)
GMM
(First-Differences)
(4)
Whole population Males
Log W2it-1 0.83
(0.06)
0.49
(0.09)
0.70
(0.07)
0.48
(0.09)
Log Uit-1 -0.03  *
(0.016)
-0.04  **
(0.02)
-0.04 **
(0.02)
-0.057 *
(0.035)
Log Ut -0.09  **
(0.02)
0.02
(0.16)
-0.04 **
(0.01)
-0.45 **
(0.17)
Log Ut-1 -0.01
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.09)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.21 **
(0.09)
Log prodt -0.12  *
(0.07)
-0.04
(0.68)
0.15 **
(0.07)
1.77 **
(0.70)
Log prodt-1 0.30  **
(0.11)
0.01
(0.16)
0.07
(0.10)
0.13
(0.18)
DPt -0.003 **
(0.001)
0.001
(0.008)
-0.002 **
(0.001)
0.02 **
(0.007)
Trend yes Yes yes yes
Set of
identifiable
time- dummies
no Yes no yes
Equation
standard error
0.042 0.042 0.04 0.038
Sargan Test 0.50 0.62 0.08 0.26
m1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
m2 0.85 0.19 0.57 0.34
Wald test
(df = 8)
----- 141.22
(0.000)
----- 117.36
(0.000)
No. of
observations
325 325 325 325
Notes: (i) Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time series
heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. (ii) * Statistically different from zero at the 0.10
level of significance. ** Statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. The
autorregresive coefficient is always significant at the 0.01 level of significance. (iii) For the
Sargan, m1 and m2 tests, the statistics reported are the p-values (i.e. the probability of generating
the calculated the test statistic under the null hypothesis). (iv) The equation standard error refers
to the equation in levels. (v) The basic instrument set is of the form Zi = diag[yi1,…,yis, Duis,
Dlfpris+1: Dxis+2(1)], (s = 1,…,14), where xit(-1) is the vector of predetermined variables included in
the regression. All the aggregate variables are taken as predetermined.
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aggregate coefficients.
Additionally, the estimated coefficients of the aggregate variables in the models
of columns (2) and (4) do not provide us with the estimates of the impact of these
aggregate variables on wages. These coefficients have no meaning. Their values depend
on which time-dummies are included in the model. We test that this is the case, that is,
we test that the coefficients of the set of identifiable dummies included in both models are
jointly not different from zero. For both models, the Wald statistic obtained lead us to
reject the null hypothesis (the statistics and the p-values are reported in table 3).
Furthermore, there is much time series evidence that shows that aggregate wages
are highly autocorrelated. For this reason we propose a three-step estimator to identify the
whole set of parameters of interest. Otherwise, we are not able to condition the common
aggregate component of wages on its lagged value.
As we discussed above, the two-step estimator we adopted in sections 3.2 and 3.3
provides us with consistent estimates of the local coefficients. Moreover, it also provides
us with consistent estimates of the common-aggregate effects on wages. On that account,
we can estimate a time-series regression function to explain the common aggregate
effects on wages. If this regression function is well specified and, now crucially, T is
large, we also obtain consistent estimates of the impact of aggregate variables on wages.
Even if T is not large, if there is not omitted aggregated variables that are correlated with
aggregate unemployment, the exercise is worth to be pursued.
Unfortunately, in our case, T is not large at all. Indeed, it is quite short. Hence, the
results of the following estimates are only exploratory. Nevertheless, for other countries,
it is possible to apply this three-step procedure to successfully study wage determination.
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 Turning to the specification of the aggregate equation, Blanchard and Katz
(1997) suggest that, although for the US the Phillips curve seems to fit the data
reasonably, it may be a misspecified model and a better representation may be an
equilibrium correction specification. Equilibrium correction mechanism models (ECM)
were initially adopted as a method for implementing economic theory in econometric
models, which is a reasonable thing to do (see Sargan, 1964 and Davidson et al., 1978).
Indeed, ECMs are a general class of models isomorphic to cointegration. Interestingly,
the Phillips curve specification is nested in the ECM specification. Hence, we estimate
regression functions of the following general form:
          tstwt1-t1tw duL)()x)ˆ1(ˆ(xaˆ wbpqjlgal ++-D+---D+=D -tt         (4)
where lt is the common aggregate component of wages at period t, that is, the year
effects in equation (2), ut is log Ut and xt is the logarithm of productivity. ds is a dummy
variable in period s. We have reasons to add a dummy variable taking the value one in the
second wave of the survey in 1991. A major stabilization program was launched in May
1991 and the change in inflation is not an adequate measure of inflation surprises at that
point in time. Thus, the inclusion of this dummy variable tries to capture a regime-shift in
the economy. Notwithstanding, we also conduct the analysis without adding the dummy
variable to our empirical models.
Note that we also impose a theoretical restriction in equation (4). We define the
error correction mechanism as 1-t1-t x)ˆ1(ECM jl --= . The reason is that without
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imposing this restriction, the wage equation we obtain is not consistent with
unemployment being untrended over the very long term (see Layard et al., 1991). After
all, as Blanchard and Katz (1997) emphasize, any (empirical) model has to satisfy this
condition. Thus, in steady state, our wage equation is given by (for g > 0):
                                       u
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Note that this specification is more appealing that the one provided in Jimeno and
Bentolila (1998) because regional wages depend on productivity instead of aggregate
wages.
In a concurrent contribution, Blanchard and Katz (1999) address a very important
related issue. They try to reconcile time-series evidence with theoretical wage relations.
They argue that aggregate wages are well represented by an equation nested in equation
(4), where lt is replaced by the aggregate wage while theory suggest that the level of
aggregate wages are determined as a function of the reservation wages, the level of
productivity and the tightness of the labor market measured, for example, by aggregate
unemployment. They suggest that the route to reconcile theory and empirical evidence is
to assume that the reservation wage depends, among other variables, on the lagged wage.
Thus, Blanchard and Katz (1999) suggest that the Phillips curve is a valid
reduction of a version of equation (4) if productivity neither affects the reservation wage
nor affects wages given the reservation wage. Additionally, and independently of whether
or not this reduction is valid, their theoretical derivation of an aggregate wage equation
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comparable to equation (4) is testable because it implies that a and g should have the
same value in their equation. Blanchard and Katz (1999) do not provide evidence on this.
Instead, they claim that the evidence, presented for example in OECD (1997), suggest
that for US g is zero and hence the Phillips curve is a valid representation of the data
while for most European countries it is on average 0.25, so the Phillips curve is not
supported by the data. However, the model specification adopted in OECD (1997)
imposes a to be zero for most countries although for US, where they find g to be
statistically not different from zero, they estimate a positive a that is statistically
significant. Of course, this evidence does not suggest that the reservation wage is not a
function of the lagged wage but suggest that the issue is not settled at all and further
research is required. Indeed, lagged wages may enter the wage equation through the
reservation wage although in a more complex form than that suggested by Blanchard and
Katz (1999). However, it also suggest that it is not possible, based on the available
evidence, to claim that productivity neither affects the reservation wage nor affects wages
given the reservation wage in US. It is not enough to find that g is zero to support this
hypothesis.10
Furthermore, we think that the best specification of the empirical model is not
necessarily the aggregate level. Working at that level of aggregation, local heterogeneity
is neglected. For example, in US, wage growth in the 80s shows impressive differences
across states. Additionally, regional shocks may have persistent effects in wage setting at
the regional level as Card’s (1990) findings suggest. Thus, we believe it is better to work
                                                                
10 Grubb (1986) also estimates wage curves for OECD countries. However, his model specification does
not include the change in productivity (his models include both trend productivity in levels and an error
correction mechanism that is a function of a quadratic trend productivity).  Thus, his estimated coefficients
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at the regional level and try to identify the effect of both regional and national variables
on wage setting. A strong argument in favor of this modeling strategy is that the study of
the local determinants of wages is as interesting as the aggregate determinants of wages.
That is, the parameters of equation (6) are the parameters of interest. As we suggest here,
a three-step procedure may provide consistent estimates of the whole set of parameters of
interest.
Before reporting the results of estimating equation (4), it is worth noting the
following issue. The dependent variable is the change in the year effects not its level.
Indeed, the coefficients of the set of time dummies in both models of column (6) in both
tables 1 and 2 provide us exactly with the change in the year effect between May 1991
and October 1997. Thus, we use these sets of coefficients as our dependent variables.
However, to estimate the error correction mechanism we need the time year effects in
equation (2). Thus, to overcome this difficulty, we estimate the level common wage
effect in October 1990 by applying the LSDV estimator of the year effect, using our
coefficient estimates given in column 6 of tables (1) and (2) and the necessary respective
means of the variables. This estimator is also consistent. Finally, we compute the ECM in
a straightforward way. Hence, our time series cover the period October 1990 – October
1997.
It is worth to be repeated that, given our time-series sample size, all the results
reported here are only exploratory. Table 4 reports the results for males. The models in
columns (1) and (3) uses the whole sample and include the dummy variable for the
stabilization program lunch period while the models in columns (2) and (4) are estimated
                                                                                                                                                                                                
are not exactly the one desired. If anything, the evidence he gathers for US is not conclusive about this
hypothesis.
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since the beginning of 1992 and hence do not include the dummy variable. The first
important thing to note is that the estimated models in columns (1) and (2) are statistically
identical. The same is true for the models in columns (3) and (4). Thus, these models are
stable to this change in the period of estimation.
Table 4: Aggregate wage equations
Independent
variable
OLS
(ECM)
(1)
OLS
(ECM)
(2)
OLS
(ECM)
(3)
OLS
(ECM)
(4)
Dependent variable:
Common effect on
Log W2
Common effect on
Log W2
Common effect on
Log Y2
Common effect on
Log Y2
D Log Prodt 0.24 **
(0.09)
0.24 **
(0.09)
0.30 **
(0.11)
0.30 **
(0.09)
ECM -0.19
(0.11)
-0.2
(0.12)
-0.47 **
(0.14)
-0.52 **
(0.12)
Log Ut -0.037 **
(0.01)
-0.04 **
(0.014)
-0.06  **
(0.014)
-0.07 **
(0.014)
DPt -0.046  **
(0.01)
-0.045 **
(0.01)
-0.05  **
(0.01)
-0.04 **
(0.01)
DPt-1 0.008 **
(0.0014)
0.008 **
(0.002)
0.009 **
(0.0016)
0.011 **
(0.002)
D4 yes no yes no
Constant yes yes yes yes
Equation standard
error
0.009 0.009 0.01 0.009
R2 0.87 0.85 0.92 0.91
Mis-specification
tests:
First-order
autocorrelation
F(1,6) = 1.58
(0.26)
F(1,5) = 0.76
(0.42)
F(1,6) = 0.99
(0.36)
F(1,5) = 0.12
(0.74)
ARCH F(1,5) = 0.96
(0.37)
F(1,4) = 0.43
(0.55)
F(1,5) = 0.31
(0.60)
F(1,4) = 0.61
(0.48)
Normality
c2(2)
RESET
0.18
(0.92)
F(1,6) = 0.25
(0.64)
0.44
(0.80)
F(1,5) = 0.53
(0.50)
0.65
(0.72)
F(1,6) = 1.18
(0.32)
0.41
(0.82)
F(1,5) = 0.23
(0.65)
No. of
observations
14 12 14 12
Notes: (i) * Statistically different from zero at the 0.10 level of significance. ** Statistically
different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. (ii) The definition of variables are in tables 1
and 3.
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All the coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant
different from zero at the five percent confidence level with the exception of the error
correction coefficient in columns (1) and (2) that is only marginally significant (we do
not reject the null of zero only slightly above the ten percent confidence level).
Additionally, with the exception of the coefficients of both the error correction and the
unemployment elasticity of pay, the remaining coefficients are statistically the same in all
specifications. For the monthly pay, both the error correction and the unemployment
elasticity of pay are higher in absolute value.
To check the specifications reported we provide a set of mis-specification tests.
We test the null hypothesis of no first-order residual autocorrelation, the null of no first-
order autocorrelated squared errors (in both cases we report the preferred F-statistic), the
null hypothesis of normality of the distribution of the residuals and the null hypothesis of
correct specification of the original model against the alternative that powers of the
predicted value of the dependent variable have been omitted in the specification of the
model (the RESET test). For the four specifications reported in table 4, we do not reject
the null hypotheses of these tests at the conventional level of statistical significance (the
statistics and the p-values are reported in table 4). Additionally, a graphical analysis,
based on recursive estimation of the models, of the null hypothesis of constant parameters
reveal no problems.
Thus, without ignoring the caveats of the analysis, we shall tentatively conclude
the following: wage determination at the regional level is influenced by both regional and
aggregate factors. The common aggregate component of regional wages is well
represented by a dynamic model where the equilibrium correction operates as a
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servomechanism in the adjustment process. Hence, tentatively, we reject the Phillips
curve representation in favor of the equilibrium correction representation for the common
aggregate component of regional wages. Therefore, we conclude that regional wages and
productivity are cointegrated. Although we imposed homogeneity in the cointegration
relationship, the restricted version performed better than an unrestricted version of our
models. Therefore, we find some support for wages to be determined, in equilibrium, by
equation (5), an equation that is supported for most economic theories of wage
determination. We also conclude that wages are negatively affected by local and
aggregate conditions. Both the local and the aggregate unemployment rates
significatively affects wages. Indeed, the estimated long run unemployment elasticity of
local pay is quite high. Finally, we shall say that the estimated equations are a plausible
representation of the data set studied.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we studied wage determination in Argentina. We believe that both
regional and national factors affect wage setting. Thus, we favor the modelization at the
regional level of aggregation. However, we show that a regional wage two-way fixed
effects error component model does not identify the effect of aggregate variables on
wages though it controls for them. Thus, the claim that the estimated unemployment
elasticity of pay in this model provides a measure of wage flexibility may be misleading.
Therefore, we propose a three-step estimator to consistently identify the whole set of
parameters of interest in a wage equation. That is, we propose a statistical approach that
may consistently estimate the coefficients of both local and aggregate variables that affect
wage setting. The estimator proposed requires the availability of a reasonable large time
series but this requirement is always present if one desire consistent estimates of
aggregate relationships. We also show that attempts to estimate both aggregate and local
variables in wage determination in a one-way fixed effects error component model may
produce severe pitfalls. Our model strategy may not be entirely successful but at least it
provides us with a good opportunity. Additionally, several test of model mis-specification
can easily be implemented to gain confidence in the third-stage model specification.
Hence, it has much to be recommended.
Turning to the results, they suggest that regional wages are autocorrelated and that the
short-run local unemployment elasticity of local pay is substantially below –0.1. Only for
hourly wages, the long-run unemployment elasticity of local pay is close to –0.1. Indeed,
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it is –0.1. Hence, on this data, we reject the wage curve specification in favor of a
dynamic regional wage equation or a dynamic wage curve.
We model the common aggregate effects on wages. We favor an error correction
mechanism instead of a Phillips curve type regression function for them. However, we
shall recall that these results are only exploratory. Additionally, our discussion makes
clear that the wage curve relies not only on the cross-section variation but also on the
time-series variation of wages and unemployment.
Without ignoring the caveats of the analysis, we conclude that wages are influenced
by both regional and aggregate factors. We also conclude that wages are negatively
affected by both local and aggregate unemployment. Indeed, the estimated long run
unemployment elasticity of local pay is high. The same is true of the respective semi-
elasticity.
Thus, interestingly enough, we find that during the period studied, Argentina showed
a reasonable response of wages to unemployment. What is more, aggregate factors seem
to be important in reducing wages. Indeed, the regional average unweighted wages have
at the end of the period studied the same values they had at the end of 1991 in spite of the
huge increase in labor productivity during the same period.
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